Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty

Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (ISBN: 9780307719225) was written by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson in 2012.

The authors make the case for structural, institutional explanations for global disparities. They use case studies to demonstrate that variation exists where alternative theories would suggest constant outcomes.

They compare inclusive economies to exclusive economies. The former are characterized by property rights, rule of law, public services that enable open exchanging of goods and contracting of labor, and permission for entrepreneurship. Inclusive economies grant economic freedoms that improve welfare directly, and also encourage the adoption of competitive technologies and investment into education. The establishment of such institutions is a critical juncture in their path-dependent framework for analyzing history.

A weak state cannot guarantee these things.

There are also extractive economies that look very prosperous for only a subset of people. These generally have unequal property rights, biased rule of law, or discriminatory bans on tradescrafts, labor contracts, or entrepreneurship.

There is some discussion of an extractive economy that funnels production into statebuilding.

The authors compare absolutist distributions of power to pluralist ones. Extractive economies are required to fund such concentrations of power. The two form a stable system. Extractive economies are unlikely to survive a pluralist distribution of power. Absolutist concentrations of power are unlikely to survive an inclusive economy. But there is no inherent inertia towards a pluralist distribution of power or an inclusive economy.

"The fact that inclusive institutions can go into reverse shows that there is no simple cumulative process of institutional improvement." (p157)

The authors love to make examples of differences in quality of life on either side of a river. They tie these to the dual economy framework (Arthur Lewis).

The authors address several other theories for development:


Case Studies

Most of the book is applying the above framework to specific case studies.


Comparison of Nogales on either side of the US-Mexico border. The region was settled by New Spain and split by the Gadsden Purchase. There are now substantial differences in income, life expectency, etc., between the portion in Arizona and the portion in Sonora.

This bleeds into a bigger picture comparison of the US and Mexico. There are many parallels in their post-colonization history:

The first discrepancy lies in reasons for declaring independence.

The second discrepancy lies in how the civil war proceeded.

The third discrepancy lies in the development of financial sectors.

The fourth discrepancy lies in the exact relationship between the military and presidency.

The fifth discrepancy lies in who profited from exploitation of native populations.


Comparison of Calca and Acomayo. Only significant historic difference between the two is that the former was outside the Potosí catchment, while Acomayo was not.


Comparison of North and South Korea, and more generally a case study of South Korea.

Korea was remarkably homogeneous until liberation from occupation, and now there is a massive disparity on either side of the 38th parallel. The boundary was completely arbitrary and ultimately was the subject to military adjudication. Furthermore, there are durable societal similarities, i.e. mandatory military service.

South Korea was not an inclusive political system under Rhee and Park, but did enforce property rights. Furthermore, Park's regime was secure enough to afford economic freedoms that led to an inclusive economy.

Il-Sung meanwhile outlawed private property and led a command economy, the Juche system.

South Korea is counted among the most successful economies of the world. In North Korea, famine is common.


Case study of the European slave trade. Its emergence coincided with a transformation of institutions in coastal African societies.

Building on this, there is a case study of the kingdom of Kongo. The Kongolese were observed to be averse to adopting certain agricultural technologies (i.e. wheels and plows) from Portuguese traders.

However...

Instead of adopting policies to encourage literacy and investment into agriculture, João directed expansion into the slave trade. This created incentives to not engage in the labor market, to not trade over long distances, to settle in remote areas beyond the effective power of the state.

Belgian Congo under Leopold II saw similar extractive economies, but also expanded the political boundary of the state. Congo achieved independence in 1960 but the government in Léopoldville, now Kinshasa, had little effective control. The territory was much larger and much more diverse than the kingdom of Kongo ever was.


Comparative analysis of Natal and Transkei, on opposite sides of the Great Kei River.

The Xhosa were a united society that lived in urban developments and practiced agriculture. They avoided much of the slave trade conflict, being far inland. This changed with the English conquest of Cape Town. Afrikaaners migrated inland and came into direct conflict with the Xhosa.

Natal, now KwaZulu-Natal, has a history of property rights and commercial agriculture. A large portion of the Xhosa society embraced cheap access to technology and equipment, such as the plow.

The chiefs in Transkei opposed land surveying that would see the communal lands divided into private properties.

The Native Lands Act in 1913 established the first part of apartheid, by decreeing that 87% of land is set aside for white men only. 'Homelands' including Transkei were the remaining 13%. In time these would become known as Bantustans, alleging that the natives were in fact not native, but Bantu migrants.


Comparative analysis of the Lele and Bushong, on opposite sides of the Kasai River in Congo

The Bushong utilized nets for hunting and crop rotation for agriculture, whereas the Lele did not, and suffered worse quality of life for it. The Bushong also enjoyed stability in rule of law, whereas the Lele did not.

The Bushong inherited the political institutions and culture of the Kuba Kingdom. This was an absolutist and extractive state, but still contributed towards a baseline economic growth and more importantly established a state powerful enough to support freedoms.


Case study of Somalia. There is no central state of substance. Historically, political power has been distributed across six clans:

Most contracts and laws revolved around diya, or compensations for murder or injury. These semi-legal codes are called heer. Subgroups of clans ("diya-paying groups") form around a particular heer, which not only was enforceable internally but set expectations for inter-group interactions. If an individual refused to pay diya, the victim's group had basis to retaliate against the accused's group.


Case study of Botswana. Khama instituted reforms that modernized the tribe politically and economically. There is a lasting impact that outlived British colonialism and administration under the high commissioner for South Africa (under which Botswana was known as Bechuanaland).


Case study of the Banda genocide.

The Dutch East India Company's first venture was the clove trade in Ambon. Tribute in that society was traditionally paid in cloves. The Dutch coerced the rulers of Ambon to sign treaties giving them a monopoly on cloves. They then coerced the rulers of neighboring Tidore, Ternate, and Bacan into treaties banning production and trade of cloves. Coerced labor soon followed.

The second venture was the mace and nutmeg trade in the Banda Islands. But these were a series of entirely decentralized villages, with no state that was capable of enforcing treaties or coercing labor. Jan Pieterszoon Coen established a capital on Java called Batavia, now Jakarta. From there he mobilized an invasion force and proceeded to genocide the Banda. Only a small number were captured alive to pass on the knowledge of mace and nutmeg production. The islands were then subdivided into 68 plantations and granted to Dutchmen. Slaves were imported to repopulate and work the land.

With this precedent, nearby societies experiences mass de-urbanization and decline in productivity. Burma moved the capital from coastal Pegu to Ava on the Irrawaddy River. The rulers of Maguindanao destroyed all pepper trees to dissuade the Dutch from approaching.


There is a very 'big picture' comparison of Eastern World vs. Western World. The West is generally typified by England.

Feudal institutions in Europe reduced the peasantry to serfdom. At the same time, slavery was abolished, seemingly because there was no utility to separate classes of serfs and slaves.

Some parts of Africa experienced this as well, such as the gult in Ethiopia, but for the most part slavery continued.

Following the plague, reduced labor force should have meant laborers had more bargaining power and thus received higher wages. Lords used political coercion to restrain this market force.

Early industrialization was opposed on the basis that it would hinder full employment. Not dissimilar to the Luddite argument.

England did not start differently from these other states, but traced a different path. Notably, these transformations coincided with:

Implication is that the creation of inclusive political institutions led to an inclusive and developed economy.


Comparison of Tudor England and Russia.

Henry VIII succeeded in limiting the power of the aristocracy, despite a political culture following from the Magna Carta. He also seized control of institutional religion by establishing the Anglican Church.

Peter the Great succeeded in undermining the Boyars, and in controlling the Orthodox Church. Importantly though, there were rebellions by the Streltsy and the Bashkirs and various others. The rebellions did not succeed but did limit the effective control of the Russian state.

The implication is that an absolutist concentration of power is a hard prerequisite of establishing an extractive economy with the intention of funneling it into statebuilding.


Case study of Venice. The overall implication is that Venice rose with political and economic freedoms in the 10th century, and fell with the consolidation of those institutions in the 13th century.

Commendas had a senior partner, who managed the local warehousing and storefront keeping, and a junior partner, who traveled abroad to trade. The senior partner generally contributed much more to startup finances. This system encouraged economic mobility.

Doge became elected position in 1032, chosen by a ducal council with 2 members. Great council supplanted doge as highest office in 1171. Ducal council eventually expanded to 6 members.

Council of forty became more powerful in time. In 1286, several proposals (some passing, some failing) were put forward to restrict membership in the great council. These led to La Serrata in 1297; anyone who had been a member within 40 years was automatically admitted to the great council, but new members needed nomination and approval from the council of forty. The next year, this was amended such that families of members were also automatically admitted.

Commenda contracts were banned. In 1314, trade was nationalized.


Case study of Roman Republic. This is characterized as a partially inclusive political institution with a partially inclusive economy. Slavery was substantial; but plebians held meaningful political leverage through successions, i.e. mass strikes, and through representation through elected plebian tribunes (a right itself gained via succession in the 5th century BCE).

Calls for land reforms, as championed by Tiberius Gracchus (who was murdered by senatorial tribunes), led to the plebian class' power being diminished. This can be traced into civil wars such as the Social War, and ultimately into Julius Caesar's seizure of Rome. Augustus Caesar/Octavian did not re-establish any inclusive institutions. Tiberius abolished the plebian tribunes entirely.

The implication is that partial inclusion is not stable and does not inherently tend towards full inclusion.


Bad Case Studies

In addition, there are several case studies that I think are poorly done.


Comparison of Buenos Aires and Asuncion.

The problem with this comparison is that the success/failure of a military campaign is not a measure of development.


Comparison of UK and US patent systems. The English economy was dominated by royal monopolies. Meanwhile in US: "Between 1820 and 1845, only 19 percent of patentees in the United States had parents who were professionals or were from recognizable major landowning families." (p33).

The problems with this comparison are two-fold:

  1. Patent systems are inherently an exclusive political institution, so why are they treated as an inclusive one by the authors here?
  2. Patent submissions reflect a decision, not an invention. There are famous case studies of the misuse of patent systems, as between Tesla and Edison. There are also modern case studies, i.e. patent trolling. The frequency of patent submissions is not a measure of innovation, but rather a measure of the utility/value of a patent.


Comparison of Bill Gates and Carlos Slim. The former innovated, won in a competitive marketplace, and still was subject to checks and regulations by Congress. The latter bought out privatized state enterprises and ran monopolies. Found to be monopoly but successfully employed legal defense of recurso de amparo.

The problem is simply that I am uncomfortable extrapolating caricatures of entire nations from two individuals' abbreviated life stories.


Case study of Jamestown, established by the Virginia Company.

The problem with this case study is that the initial Jamestown colony consisted of just over 100 people. There is no way to make an institutional argument out of such a small society, especially since it was (as noted above) embargoed.


Case study of early colonization in Australia, especially the Squatters. The lack of established/landed interests enabled incentives for innovation, investment, and productivity.

The problem with this case study is that too much of the book is devoted to investigating how weak states depress development because they cannot guarantee security and property rights. Australia certainly didn't provide those... again, Squatters'. If there's an implication to salvage, it's that the difference between most weak states and the early Australian colony is that colonists had sufficient technological advantages to self-guarantee security and property rights against Aboriginals, and that the presence of Aboriginals whom could be cheaply threatened and stolen from discouraged colonists from doing so to each other. Setting aside ethics... these are plainly not durable nor repeatable conditions. This is not a meaningful case study. Also, there's an epistemological problem. The claim that Australia saw rapid development during early colonization is rooted in the assumption that there was a baseline of zero development beforehand. Of course moving from zero to nonzero is rapid development. And it's fundamentally flawed to characterize the area as having zero development beforehand; it just wasn't developed in the way that colonists aimed to.


Comparison of Japan and China. Both had extractive economies, bans on international trade, and absolutist monarchies. Both experienced destabilization from European colonial powers around the same time.

Tokugawa shogunate was absolutist but had much less effective control. There was a nascent organized opposition in Satsuma and Choushuu that led into the Meiji Restoration.

Implication is that the rapid dispersion of power in Meiji Japan disrupted the exclusive and extractive economy there.

The problem is that there are far more confounding factors at play here.


Reading Notes


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