Trump Tariffs

A history of the tariffs under Trump.

First Administration

Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the a range of presidential powers if the ITC finds that imports are causing injury to domestic industry. In early 2018, Trump leveraged this to impose extra 'safeguard' tariffs on solar panel and washing machine imports.

Shortly after, Trump leveraged section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum (25% and 10%, respectively). Exemptions were carved out for Canada, Mexico, the EU, SouthKorea/South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, and Australia, but most of these were closed within a few months.

China retaliated to the section 201 tariffs with anti-dumping tariffs on U.S. sorghum. For the section 232 tariffs, retaliatory tariffs were imposed on aluminum and a variety of agricultural products. However, China was more specifically targeted through a section 301 (also of the Trade Act) investigation into unfair trade practices. The Trump administration produced an initial list of Chinese machinery and electronics goods that, starting in June, faced tariffs of 25% tariffs. The retaliatory list targeted U.S. vehicles and even more agricultural goods, like soybeans. Shortly after the Trump administration announced a new list, this time targeting consumer goods, on which it planned to impose tariffs of 10%. This came with a threat to increase the rate to 25%, which ultimately did happen almost a year later. China similarly introduced tariffs on many consumer goods, also at 25%. The trade war again escalated in 2019, as new lists were produced which would cover nearly all trade. Rates as high as 42.5% (against U.S. cars) were threatened. Huawei was indicted in the U.S. and (along with all subsidiaries) added to the Entity List, effectively banning sale of U.S. goods to it. A 'phase one' trade deal was however agreed in early 2020; this did not adjust tariff rates and instead called for China to import $200 billion of U.S. goods. This of course did not happen.

Turkey was targeted with doubled tariff rates on steel and aluminum. Turkey retaliated with extremely high tariffs against U.S. cars, alcohol, and tobacco.

Importantly, Trump had initiated renegotiation of NAFTA in late 2017. The ongoing talks characterized this trade war. Canada's response included retaliatory tariffs on aluminum, steel, and a variety of agricultural products. Mexico's response targeted steel and agricultural products like pork. The USMCA, finally agreed in mid 2019, led to all section 232 tariffs and retaliatory tariffs being lifted.

The EU retaliated with a diverse portfolio of tariffs, targeting U.S. products like bourbon and motorcycles.

In addition, South Korea, China, and the EU all filed complaints with the WTO. Ultimately the WTO rules against the U.S. in 2022.

In 2019, India's was removed from the Generalized System of Preferences; India responded with tariffs on agricultural products.

In early 2020, the existing section 232 tariffs were expanded to cover derivative steel products.

In mid 2020, Trump reneges on the USMCA and re-imposes tariffs on Canadian aluminum, which leads to retaliatory tariffs on U.S. aluminum and derivative products. These are cancelled after about a month.

Second Administration

Immediate Program

Immediate actions taken by Trump upon election were largely targeted at China, Mexico, and Canada.

• Set tariffs of 20% on all imports from Chinese

• Set tariffs of 25% on many specific imports from Canada and Mexico

• Ordered the USPS end the de minimis exemption on parcels from China.

The measures set against Mexico and Canada quickly dissolved. First, temporary exceptions were made for specific manufacturers, especially automotive manufacturers, for imports from Canada and Mexico that are compliant with USMCA. Then the implementation was delayed entirely.

Similarly, the de minimis implementation quickly fell through. USPS and CBP were not prepared to process duties for this quantity of small parcels, so parcel services with China and Hong Kong were closed immediately. The fallout of this closure forced the administration to delay implementation entirely.

It is nonetheless important to note that the anticipation of a tariff war contributed to the downfall of the Trudeau government. Trudeau and Freeland disagreed on how to respond to the threat, and the latter's resignation triggered a loss of confidence. Trudeau resigned and announced a leadership contest, through which Carney emerged the winner. In the meantime, provincial governments retaliated within their powers. Ontario announced export fees on energy and threatened to ban energy exports entirely. Several provinces, such as British Columbia, effectively banned importation of American alcohol through their control of alcohol distribution.

Reciprocal Program

In April 2025, a 'standardized' tariff program was announced.

• 'Baseline' tariffs of 10% on all imports.

• Supplemental 'reciprocal' tariffs set on a country-by-country basis. These are in fact calculated according to BOP; they are not reciprocal.

  • Highest rate was set on Lesotho, at 50%.

  • Strangest rate is 10% on the joint (US-UK) military base in the British Indian Ocean Territory.

China became a nexus for the trade war. Jinping announced retaliatory tariffs on American agriculture and export controls on specific manufacturers. A sequence of ratcheting escalations landed on tariff rates of 145% (into U.S.) and 125% (into China). In an attempt to make the rates more punishing, Trump announced that the reciprocal tariffs for all other countries were frozen for 3 months.

Unexpectedly though, a bilateral agreement emerged in early May that set a framework for lowering tariff rates to 30% (into U.S.) and 10% (into China). This deal was briefly reneged at the end of May on the basis of rare earths export controls, but re-entered within a couple weeks. A more concrete agreement was announced in November; tariffs on imports from China were lowered by another 10%.

Aside from China, these bilateral trade deals emerged within the freeze period:

• In May, Starmer announced a piecewise deal. The tariff rate applied to cars is lowered to 10% (into U.S.). Steel, aluminum, and specific aerospace components are exempted from tariffs entirely. The UK meanwhile will drop trade barriers against beef imports.

• Shortly after the 'reciprocal' tariffs were announced, Vietnam lowered tariffs unilaterally. A deal emerged in late June: rates were set at 20% (into U.S.) and 0% (into Vietnam). Additionally, goods that are only shipped through Vietnam into the U.S. face an additional 20% tariff upon arrival.

• Indonesia negotiated rates set at 19% (into U.S.) and 0% (into Indonesia). Significant purchase orders by the Indonesian government of U.S. energy, agricultural products, and military jets were also components of the negotiated deal.

• Japan negotiated lower rates on cars and automotive parts; while a rate of 25% applies to all other countries, imports from Japan will be taxed at 15%. The agreement also set a ceiling of 10% on lumber tariffs.

• Around the same time, South Korea also negotiated a 15% rate. It was not formalized until November however. The 15% rate here is applied to all tariffs.

• Von Der Leyen announced a deal in late July. Due to the structure of the EU, there are opportunities for it to fall through, but the negotiated rates are 15% for most goods (into U.S.) (exception for steel, taxed at 50%) and 0% (into EU). Significant purchase orders of U.S. energy are also part of the deal.

In contrast, several countries were targeted with further actions in July. The context however reveals that these tariff actions are about geopolitics rather than trade.

• Tariffs of 25%, plus an unspecified penalty, were set on imports from India. The penalty is conditioned on whether India continues to purchase energy from Russia. It is notable that this rate is lower than the 27% announced in April.

  • Lifted in February 2026 through a trade agreement; see below.

• Tariffs of 50% were set on most imports from Brazil--products such as aerospace parts are exempted. This was announced alongside sanctions for the judge overseeing the prosecution of Bolsonaro.

  • Partially lifted (for agricultural products) in November.

• Additional tariffs of 10%, with a planned rise to 25%, were announced against countries opposed to a U.S. annexation of Greenland. The EU responded by 'pausing' the earlier trade agreement and threatening to invoke the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI). Trump backed down from this plan within a week.

Later bilateral trade agreements include:

• A series of agreements with Asian nations (Australia, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Vietnam) were announced in October; none of these actually addressed the 'reciprocal' tariffs.

• In November, Switzerland and Liechtenstein negotiated a U.S. tariff rate of 15%. Then in January Trump announced that the tariffs against Swiss imports were a personal attack against Karin Keller-Sutter.

• El Salvador and Guatemala negotiated a U.S. tariff rate of 10%, with tariffs removed on specific goods qualifying under the 2004 Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).

• Also in November, vague agreements (i.e., tariffs removed on specific goods which are not specified) were made with Argentina and Ecuador.

• In January 2026, Taiwan negotiated a U.S. tariff rate of 15%.

• In February, agreements were negotiated with India (U.S. tariff rate lowered to 18%) and Bangladesh (lowered to 19%).

• Also in February, another vague agreement was made with North Macedonia.

The de minimis exemption was eventually closed (worldwide in August, and specifically in China in April).

In February 2026, the Supreme Court ruled in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that presidents do not have the authority to impose tariff programs like this. Trump responded by leveraging section 122 (also of the Trade Act) to set universal 15% tariffs, even on countries that had negotiated lower rates as noted above. This section requires Congressional approval within 150 days and, besides this, is expected to be ruled similarly unconstitutional shortly.

Section 232 Program

The section 232 tariffs of the first administration were revived and greatly expanded.

In March 2024, tariffs were set at 25% on all car, steel, and aluminum imports. This led to several reciprocal tariffs being set against the U.S.:

• Von Der Leyen announced reciprocal tariffs on steel and aluminum coming into the EU. Of the 27 member states, only Hungary voted against these measures. Implementation however was delayed as diplomatic options were being exercised.

• The new Carney government announced retaliatory tariffs on American raw goods such as steel and aluminum.

In June, these rates were doubled to 50%. As well, the DoC determined that appliances made of steel and aluminum are covered by steel tariffs.

In August, copper was added to this list.

In October and November, multiple new categories of tariffs were introduced also on the basis of section 232. Bilateral trade deals do supersede these however.

• 25% tariffs on "medium- and heavy-duty trucks, truck parts, and buses"
• 10% on softwood lumber
• 25% on upholstered furniture, increasing in the future to 30%
• 25% on kitchen cabinets and vanities, increasing in the future to 50%

The 'in the future' increases above were originally announced to be effective January 2026, but were delayed by one year in December 2025.

In January 2026, semiconductor tariffs set at 25% were introduced also on the basis of section 232.

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