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| If the design of study is democratic voting rules, then the [[PoliticalScience/RationalChoiceVoting|theory of rational choice voting]] is the appropriate specialization. | Institutional design is the study of how actors behave within an institution (or otherwise-defined rule set) and of how to shape an institution to yield certain behavior. It implicitly assumes [[PoliticalScience/Instrumentalism|instrumentalism]] in that the form of institutions derives from utility rather than [[PoliticalPhilosophy|philosophy]]. Beyond this, it generally builds from either public choice or social choice methods for measuring and comparing utility. For studies of democratic (little d, one-person-one-vote) voting rules, the [[PoliticalScience/RationalChoiceVoting|theory of rational choice voting]] is the appropriate specialization. Legislators are generally characterized by some combination of [[CongressTheElectoralConnection|credit claiming]] and [[ThePoliticsOfBlameAvoidance|blame avoiding]]. |
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| * [[ThePoliticsOfBlameAvoidance|The Politics of Blame Avoidance]], R. Kent Weaver, 1986 | |
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| * [[DidHamiltonJeffersonAndMadisonCauseTheUSGovernmentShutdown|Did Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison “Cause” the U.S. Government Shutdown? The Institutional Path from an Eighteenth Century Republic to a Twenty-first Century Democracy]], John H. Aldrich, 2015 | |
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| * [[DolceFarNiente|Dolce far niente? Non-compliance and blame avoidance in the EU]]; Lisa Kriegmair, Berthold Rittberger, Bernhard Zangl, and Tim Heinkelmann-Wild; 2021 | |
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| * [[AgencyInstitutionsAndWelfareChauvinism|Agency, institutions, and welfare chauvinism: Tracing the exclusion of European Union migrant citizens from social assistance in Germany]]; Dominic Afscharian, Cecilia Bruzelius, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser; 2024 * [[WhenIncumbentsSuccessfullyRetrenchBigAndPopularSocialPolicies|When incumbents successfully retrench big and popular social policies: policy design matters]], Marta Arretche and Pedro H. G. F. Souza, 2024 |
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| * [[LegislativeReciprocity|Legislative reciprocity: Using a proposal lottery to identify causal effects]], Semra Sevi and Donald P. Green, 2025 * [[BureaucraticPoliticsInCustomizedImplementationOfTheEUSingleUsePlasticsDirectiveInFranceAndGermany|Bureaucratic politics in customized implementation of the EU Single-Use Plastics Directive in France and Germany]], Anna Simstich, 2025 * [[CompanyTowns|Company Towns: Single-Industry Dominance and Local Government Capacity]], Elizabeth Mitchell Elder, 2025 * [[DecentralizationAndIdeology|Decentralization and ideology]]; Anna M. Wilke, Georgiy Syunyaev, and Michael Ting; 2026 |
Institutional Design
Institutional design is a field that studies the game theoretic and comparative outcomes of structures.
Contents
Description
Institutional design is the study of how actors behave within an institution (or otherwise-defined rule set) and of how to shape an institution to yield certain behavior.
It implicitly assumes instrumentalism in that the form of institutions derives from utility rather than philosophy. Beyond this, it generally builds from either public choice or social choice methods for measuring and comparing utility.
For studies of democratic (little d, one-person-one-vote) voting rules, the theory of rational choice voting is the appropriate specialization.
Legislators are generally characterized by some combination of credit claiming and blame avoiding.
Reading Notes
The Theory of Political Coalitions William H. Riker, 1962
Congressmen in Committees, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., 1973
Congress: The Electoral Connection, David R. Mayhew, 1974
The Politics of Blame Avoidance, R. Kent Weaver, 1986
Foreign Policy Begins at Home, Richard N. Haass, 2013
Did Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison “Cause” the U.S. Government Shutdown? The Institutional Path from an Eighteenth Century Republic to a Twenty-first Century Democracy, John H. Aldrich, 2015
The Limits of Party: Congress and Lawmaking in a Polarized Era, Frances E. Lee, 2020
Dolce far niente? Non-compliance and blame avoidance in the EU; Lisa Kriegmair, Berthold Rittberger, Bernhard Zangl, and Tim Heinkelmann-Wild; 2021
A Case for Congress: Shared Power for a Divided Society, Frances E. Lee, 2024
Agency, institutions, and welfare chauvinism: Tracing the exclusion of European Union migrant citizens from social assistance in Germany; Dominic Afscharian, Cecilia Bruzelius, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser; 2024
When incumbents successfully retrench big and popular social policies: policy design matters, Marta Arretche and Pedro H. G. F. Souza, 2024
Demanding more than what you want, Zuheir Desai and Scott A. Tyson, 2025
Persistent unilateral action, David Foster, 2025
Legislative reciprocity: Using a proposal lottery to identify causal effects, Semra Sevi and Donald P. Green, 2025
Bureaucratic politics in customized implementation of the EU Single-Use Plastics Directive in France and Germany, Anna Simstich, 2025
Company Towns: Single-Industry Dominance and Local Government Capacity, Elizabeth Mitchell Elder, 2025
Decentralization and ideology; Anna M. Wilke, Georgiy Syunyaev, and Michael Ting; 2026