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If the design of study is democratic voting rules, then the [[PoliticalScience/RationalChoiceVoting|theory of rational choice voting]] is the appropriate specialization. Institutional design is the study of how actors behave within an institution (or otherwise-defined rule set) and of how to shape an institution to yield certain behavior.

It implicitly assumes [[PoliticalScience/Instrumentalism|instrumentalism]] in that the form of institutions derives from utility rather than [[PoliticalPhilosophy|philosophy]]. Beyond this, it generally builds from either public choice or social choice methods for measuring and comparing utility.

For studies of democratic (little d, one-person-one-vote) voting rules, the [[PoliticalScience/RationalChoiceVoting|theory of rational choice voting]] is the appropriate specialization.

Legislators are generally characterized by some combination of [[CongressTheElectoralConnection|credit claiming]] and [[ThePoliticsOfBlameAvoidance|blame avoiding]].
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 * [[ThePoliticsOfBlameAvoidance|The Politics of Blame Avoidance]], R. Kent Weaver, 1986
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 * [[DolceFarNiente|Dolce far niente? Non-compliance and blame avoidance in the EU]]; Lisa Kriegmair, Berthold Rittberger, Bernhard Zangl, and Tim Heinkelmann-Wild; 2021
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 * [[AgencyInstitutionsAndWelfareChauvinism|Agency, institutions, and welfare chauvinism: Tracing the exclusion of European Union migrant citizens from social assistance in Germany]]; Dominic Afscharian, Cecilia Bruzelius, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser; 2024
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 * [[LegislativeReciprocity|Legislative reciprocity: Using a proposal lottery to identify causal effects]], Semra Sevi and Donald P. Green, 2025
 * [[BureaucraticPoliticsInCustomizedImplementationOfTheEUSingleUsePlasticsDirectiveInFranceAndGermany|Bureaucratic politics in customized implementation of the EU Single-Use Plastics Directive in France and Germany]], Anna Simstich, 2025
 * [[CompanyTowns|Company Towns: Single-Industry Dominance and Local Government Capacity]], Elizabeth Mitchell Elder, 2025
 * [[DecentralizationAndIdeology|Decentralization and ideology]]; Anna M. Wilke, Georgiy Syunyaev, and Michael Ting; 2026

Institutional Design

Institutional design is a field that studies the game theoretic and comparative outcomes of structures.

Contents

  1. Institutional Design
    1. Description
    2. Reading Notes

Description

Institutional design is the study of how actors behave within an institution (or otherwise-defined rule set) and of how to shape an institution to yield certain behavior.

It implicitly assumes instrumentalism in that the form of institutions derives from utility rather than philosophy. Beyond this, it generally builds from either public choice or social choice methods for measuring and comparing utility.

For studies of democratic (little d, one-person-one-vote) voting rules, the theory of rational choice voting is the appropriate specialization.

Legislators are generally characterized by some combination of credit claiming and blame avoiding.

Reading Notes

CategoryRicottone

PoliticalScience/InstitutionalDesign (last edited 2026-03-09 17:57:44 by DominicRicottone)