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| == Description == If the design of study is democratic voting rules, then the [[PoliticalScience/RationalChoiceVoting|theory of rational choice voting]] is the appropriate specialization. ---- |
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| * [[AnEconomicTheoryOfDemocracy|An Economic Theory of Democracy]], Anthony Downs, 1957 * [[TheCalculusOfConsent|The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy]], James M. Buchanon and Gordon Tullock, 1962 |
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| * [[UnderstandingVoterFatigue|Understanding Voter Fatigue: Election Frequency and Electoral Abstention Approval]], Filip Kostelka, 2025 | |
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| * [[LegislativeReciprocity|Legislative reciprocity: Using a proposal lottery to identify causal effects]], Semra Sevi and Donald P. Green, 2025 |
Institutional Design
Institutional design is a field that studies the game theoretic and comparative outcomes of structures.
Contents
Description
If the design of study is democratic voting rules, then the theory of rational choice voting is the appropriate specialization.
Reading Notes
The Theory of Political Coalitions William H. Riker, 1962
Congressmen in Committees, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., 1973
Congress: The Electoral Connection, David R. Mayhew, 1974
Foreign Policy Begins at Home, Richard N. Haass, 2013
The Limits of Party: Congress and Lawmaking in a Polarized Era, Frances E. Lee, 2020
A Case for Congress: Shared Power for a Divided Society, Frances E. Lee, 2024
Demanding more than what you want, Zuheir Desai and Scott A. Tyson, 2025
Persistent unilateral action, David Foster, 2025
Legislative reciprocity: Using a proposal lottery to identify causal effects, Semra Sevi and Donald P. Green, 2025