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| When parties are the unit of analysis, the structure of the state is taken as given. Often the aspects of a political system like 'district multiplicity' explain the differential outcomes. | When parties are the unit of analysis, the structure of the state is taken as given. Often the aspects of a political system like [[ConceptualizingAndMeasuringDistrictMagnitudeForComparativeResearch|district magnitude]] explain the differential outcomes. |
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| * [[BureaucraticPoliticsInCustomizedImplementationOfTheEUSingleUsePlasticsDirectiveInFranceAndGermany|Bureaucratic politics in customized implementation of the EU Single-Use Plastics Directive in France and Germany]], Anna Simstich, 2025 * [[EuropeanIntegrationAndTransformedParliamentaryOpposition|European integration and transformed parliamentary opposition: Evidence from five decades of legislative politics]], Karl Loxbo and Brigitte Pircher, 2026 * [[RebelsInTheHouse|Rebels in the house: Do anti-elitist parties vote differently?]], Simon Otjes and Luc Vorsteveld, 2026 * [[ConceptualizingAndMeasuringDistrictMagnitudeForComparativeResearch|Conceptualizing and measuring district magnitude for comparative research: How to do it and why it matters]], Orit Kedar and Gilad Hurvitz; 2026 |
Electoral Systems
Electoral systems is a subfield of comparative politics.
Contents
Description
When electoral systems are studied with strong assumptions about rationality and utility functions, it is called institutional design.
When countries are the unit of analysis, national descriptives like ethnic cleavages and resource wealth are taken as given. Often these environmental factors explain the differential outcomes.
When parties are the unit of analysis, the structure of the state is taken as given. Often the aspects of a political system like district magnitude explain the differential outcomes.
There is structuralism, but not not necessarily individual agency.
Reading Notes
Japan in 1994: Out with the Old, in with the New?, Michael Blaker, 1995
Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach, Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, 2003
Electoral Reform and the Evolution of Informal Norms in Japan, Matthew M. Carlson, 2006
Foreign Policy Begins at Home, Richard N. Haass, 2013
Racial Conflict in Global Society, John Stone and Polly Rizova, 2014
Dolce far niente? Non-compliance and blame avoidance in the EU; Lisa Kriegmair, Berthold Rittberger, Bernhard Zangl, and Tim Heinkelmann-Wild; 2021
Agency, institutions, and welfare chauvinism: Tracing the exclusion of European Union migrant citizens from social assistance in Germany; Dominic Afscharian, Cecilia Bruzelius, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser; 2024
When incumbents successfully retrench big and popular social policies: policy design matters, Marta Arretche and Pedro H. G. F. Souza, 2024
A Case for Congress: Shared Power for a Divided Society, Frances E. Lee, 2024
The effects of district magnitude on the number of intra-party factions: the case of Colombia, 1958–1990 Germán Campos-Herrera and Patricio Navia, 2024
Term limits in parliament and electoral disconnection: the case of the Five Star Movement; Francesco Bromo, Paolo Gambacciani, and Marco Improta; 2024
Legislative Effectiveness in the American States; Peter Bucchianeri, Craig Volden, and Alan E. Wiseman; 2025
Bureaucratic politics in customized implementation of the EU Single-Use Plastics Directive in France and Germany, Anna Simstich, 2025
European integration and transformed parliamentary opposition: Evidence from five decades of legislative politics, Karl Loxbo and Brigitte Pircher, 2026
Rebels in the house: Do anti-elitist parties vote differently?, Simon Otjes and Luc Vorsteveld, 2026
Conceptualizing and measuring district magnitude for comparative research: How to do it and why it matters, Orit Kedar and Gilad Hurvitz; 2026