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Congresspeople are modeled as actors seeking re-election. They are expected to behave correspondingly, especially in three categories of initiatives: '''advertising''', '''credit claiming''', and '''position taking'''. Structural incentives control the efficacy of these categories and congresspeople are expected to adjust their behavior in response. This model's interpretation leads to several key conclusions about the design of Congress. * Congress is very well designed for actors seeking re-election. * Congresspeople service their constituents, which includes both the voters of their constituents and influential interest groups, but they especially service their constituents. * Congress is not a competitive and representative arena for deciding from policy options. There are no [[TheTheoryOfPoliticalCoalitions|minimum winning coalitions]]. == Part 1 == The first part of the book establishes the theoretic model. |
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| The author is not arguing that reelection is the only goal, or the most important goal universally, just the one that best predicts behavior. More importantly, reelection as a goal provides an accountability mechanism that is fundamental to the interpretation of the model. So for the author's model, congresspeople are "single minded reelection seekers" (p.17). | |
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| [[AnEconomicTheoryOfDemocracy|Downs constructs]] a similar model with parties as the analytic unit. (Parties put forward a platform and voters respond rationally. Congresspeople are just an intermediary.) The author argues that this model misses the reality of Congress. Policy is produced not by cohesive teams but by rivalry and bargaining. Voters cannot form expectations to inform decisions. The author argues that this model is best applied to executive elections (presidents, governors, mayors). These offices produce policy firmly aligned by a single platform. Especially given an incumbent, voters can clearly form expectations. | Restricting the goals to re-election provides an accountability mechanism that is fundamental to the interpretation. So for the author's model, congresspeople are "single minded reelection seekers" (p.17). Important to note that congresspeople optimize, not maximize. Diminishing returns on re-election initiatives when you are already 'sure' to win. Very little value on them when you are 'sure' to lose. [[AnEconomicTheoryOfDemocracy|Downs constructs]] a model with parties as the analytic unit. (Parties put forward a platform and voters respond rationally. Congresspeople are just an intermediary.) The author argues that this model misses the reality of Congress. Policy is produced not by cohesive teams but by rivalry and bargaining. Voters cannot form expectations to inform decisions. The author argues that this model is best applied to executive elections (presidents, governors, mayors). These offices produce policy firmly aligned by a single platform. Especially given an incumbent, voters can clearly form expectations. |
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| Next the author examines congressional districts given those priors. Voters don't have solid knowledge or expectations about legislation. They need to use their own resources to win support. Especially focused on marginal congressional districts. However, looking at party swings across elections in individual congressional seats, about a third of the variance is explained by national effects.The remainder is local effects. 'Marginal' seats are really a misnomer. "When we say 'Congressman Smith is unbeatable,' we do not mean that there is nothing he could do that would lose him his seat. Rather we mean, 'Congressman Smith is unbeatable as long as he continues to do the things he is doing.' (p.37). | Author has no expectation of differential behavior in 'marginal seats'. Rather, it's a misnomer. Looking at party swings between elections in individual congressional seats, about a third of variance is explained by national effects. The remainder is local effects. 'All politics is local'. "When we say 'Congressman Smith is unbeatable,' we do not mean that there is nothing he could do that would lose him his seat. Rather we mean, 'Congressman Smith is unbeatable as long as he continues to do the things he is doing.' (p.37). |
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| Many congressional swings are attributed to the incumbent president instead of legislation.There is some evidence that marginal congresspeople vote with the party more frequently.That also implies that marginal congresspeople in the minority are incentivized to push disastrous policy. The sort of policies that voters could realistically observe (esp. the economy) have too many dynamic factors for congresspeople to design and execute strategies. The sort of legislative initiatives that voters could realistically form expectations around (New Deal, Great Society, etc.) don't necessarily lead to favorable congressional swings. In summary, the author argues that congresspeople cannot affect a congressional swing, but they can affect their own odds of winning their reelection. |
A major point is that voters don't have solid knowledge or expectations about legislation. They rely on proxies to determine if a legislator supports what they support. And because congresspeople use their own resources to win support |
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| Important to note that congresspeople optimize, not maximize.Diminishing returns on reelection initiatives when you are already 'sure' to win.Very little value when you are 'sure' to lose. Congresspeople also have a confirmation bias about their efforts.To face reelection, each has already won a primary and congressional election.Dramatic deviations from what worked before are viewed with skepticism. |
Congresspeople also have a confirmation bias about what 'works'. To face re-election, each has already won a primary ''and'' congressional election. |
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| Three relevant activities | The author describes three categories of re-election activities or assets: |
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| * Congresspeople can take any number of positions. It isn't limited to actual substantive actions. Just as people are uncertain of legislation, they are uncertain of positions. So positions matter more-so in telling people what they want to hear, rather than what you have done. | * Congresspeople can take any number of positions. It isn't limited to actual substantive actions. Just as people are uncertain of legislation, they are uncertain of positions. So positions matter more-so in telling people what they want to hear, rather than what you have done. |
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| The author suggests that senators place more emphasis on position taking than credit claiming, while representatives do the reverse. Suggests that senators (for one reason or another) are more successful with advertising and credit claiming. (More credible? More access to ad money? Constituents of entire states differ in some structural manner as compared to single districts such that credit claiming is more salient?) | Some immediate consequences: * Senators place relatively more emphasis on credit claiming, as compared to representatives, because they are more credible (i.e., hold greater prestige), have more advertising assets, and have a larger direct constituency that can form more salient interests. * Also notable that many senators aim to be president, which shapes their long term strategy. TODO: read Perry The New Politics for application to NY assembly and senate. * Similar trend in old machine cities. TODO: read Snowiss Congressional Recruitment and Representation for application to Chicago. |
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| The author suggests there is a similar trend in old machine cities. TODO: read... * Snowiss Congressional Recruitment and Representation for application to Chicago. |
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| Also meaningful that many senators aim to be president, which shapes their long term strategy. TODO: read... * Perry The New Politics for application to NY assembly and senate. |
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| The author argues that Congress (meaning the House and Senate, but also all Congress-mandated institutions and norms) is well designed for reelection seeking congresspeople. | == Part 2 == The second part of the book interprets the model, especially with regard to how cooperation and competition is expected to look at the Congressional level. Congress is well designed for re-election seeking congresspeople. |
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| These services are non-rivalrous: not a zero sum game among congresspeople. It actually looks like a "cross-party conspiracy among incumbents" (p.105). | ''Most importantly:'' these services and functions are non-rivalrous. ''Not'' a zero sum game. It actually looks like a "cross-party conspiracy among incumbents" (p.105). |
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| Consequences of this design: * Congress is "noisy, versatile, and effective" (p.108). It acts as a constant opposition; all congresspeople, esp. senators, have an incentive to claim a position in comparison to the current president's policy. Institutions reinforce those incentives regardless of party, and also amplify their ability to get voters to listen to their objections. * Congresspeople do service their direct constituents as a form of credit claiming. * Congress does not operate as a competitive and representative arena for policy options. Some models of legislatures imagine Congress as a proxy for ad hoc referenda among the population. Individual congresspeople distort that model: They bargain and trade votes. They select the policy options that can be considered, filtering out a large policy space. They can use soft power (hearings, committees, threats of further legislation) to influence the actual implementation of legislation, beyond the actual terms of it. |
Consequences: * Congress is "noisy, versatile, and effective" (p.108). It operates as an opposition. All congresspeople, esp. senators, have an incentive to claim a position in comparison to the current president's policy. * Party does not matter. * Congress does not operate as a competitive and representative arena for policy options. * Some models of legislatures imagine the institution to be a proxy for ad hoc referenda among the population. * Congresspeople distort that model. * Bargaining and trading votes * Selection-out of disfavorable policy options * Several implements of soft power (e.g., hearings, committees, threats of further legislation) to influence the actual implementation of legislation, beyond the literal terms of it * No minimum winning coalitions. * There isn't significant evidence of 'close votes' in the first place. * Congresspeople default to a 'universal approach'; service own constituents while letting other congresspeople service their constituents. * When an issue is salient to a congresspersons's constituents, they care only about claiming credit for the 'right side'. Does not matter if their amendment carries, if the bill passes, if the bill is signed, or if the law is good policy; constituents generally only understand the voting record. * When an issue is salient to organized and informed interest groups, they do start to care about mobilizing and bargaining for votes. * Parties do not constrain how congresspeople vote. * Congress will effectively prioritize pork barrel bills, interest group politics, and symbolic votes. Policy bills, especially national programs like welfare and entitlements, have more costs than benefits and will be deprioritized. This will necessarily look like delays and stalling. * "If it is believed that spending money will 'solve social problems,' then Congress will spend money." (p.139) |
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| Several models of Congress (e.g. Riker Theory of Political Coalitions) expect minimal winning coalitions. There isn't much evidence of close votes in Congress. The author argues that congresspeople take a universal approach as the default. When an issue is salient to their constituents, they care only about being able to claim credit for the right cause.Congresspeople don't care if their amendments carry, only that they can claim credit for introducing them. They don't care how the party votes, only how they individually vote. Only when an intense interest group is monitoring do they seem to actually mobilize and bargain for a bill. | There is a tragedy of the commons; congresspeople want pork barrel bills ''and'' the ability to push more pork barrel bills next year. The whole body self-regulates to ensure that the 'commons' is maintained. The leaders (speaker, majority leader) and control committees (Rules; Appropriations; Ways and Means) are the maintainers. * Of these, only Appropriations and Ways and Means offer a conventional re-election asset. But all of these are evidently desirable positions. |
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| This all creates a congressional environment that is focused on pushing pork barrel and interest group politics, and purely symbolic votes, all while indefinitely delaying policy legislation. National programs, esp. welfare and entitlement programs, are fraught with danger for congresspeople but bring little advantage. "If it is believed that spending money will 'solve social problems,' then Congress will spend money." (p.139). There is a tragedy of the commons game wherein congresspeople want pork barrel to a ruinous end; the whole body self regulates to ensure that the commons (institutional prestige, ability to allocate new pork barrel, etc) is maintained. The leaders and control committees are the ones administering that maintenance, and are rewarded with particular prestige. The office of the Speaker, office of the majority leader, committees of Rules, Appropriations, Ways and Means. Of these, only Appropriations and Ways and Means offer a conventional electoral asset. But all of these are evidently desirable positions. The closest equivalent in the Senate, the Finance committee, doesn't regulate spending in the same way, reflecting the different interests of senators. See Manley The Politics of Finance. | The closest Senate equivalent is the Finance committee, doesn't regulate spending in the same way, reflecting the different interests of senators. TODO: read: Manley The Politics of Finance. |
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| Author makes some brief remarks about how to reform governments in order to reduce pork barrel. There are some naive comments about strengthening the executive branch. City governments are used as evidence, in a way that grossly oversimplifies the agency of city political systems. Also a comparative study of France and the US, to the same effect. Think De Gaulle and 1958. | == Reading Notes == The author makes suggestions for congressional reforms, to disincentivize pork barrel bills and incentivize good policy bills. These come across as naive. There's substantial reference to city government, especially when suggesting reforms. Setting city legislatures aside as being different in part 1, then suggesting an adoption of their structure in part 2, seems like a fallacy at best and abandonment of the model (from legislator agents to an institution as the agent) at worst. I think the author is a bit too dismissive of the idea that marginal congresspeople either tie their re-election aspirations to the president's popularity, or try to push bad policy in order to sabotage the president's popularity. |
Congress: The Electoral Connection
Congress: The Electoral Connection was written by David R. Mayhew in 1974. A second edition was published in 2004 (ISBN: 9780300105872).
Congresspeople are modeled as actors seeking re-election. They are expected to behave correspondingly, especially in three categories of initiatives: advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. Structural incentives control the efficacy of these categories and congresspeople are expected to adjust their behavior in response. This model's interpretation leads to several key conclusions about the design of Congress.
- Congress is very well designed for actors seeking re-election.
- Congresspeople service their constituents, which includes both the voters of their constituents and influential interest groups, but they especially service their constituents.
Congress is not a competitive and representative arena for deciding from policy options. There are no minimum winning coalitions.
Part 1
The first part of the book establishes the theoretic model.
The author first interrogates the underlying assumption: congresspeople want to be reelected.
- Some discussion of volunteerism, voluntary turnover rates, and term limit reforms.
- Mostly in the context of state and city legislatures.
The author sidesteps the question by focusing on the U.S. House and Senate, which is widely accepted as being in a swing of career politicians, and the basis of such a career is reelection.
Next the author compares their model to contemporary researchers.
Fenno argues that congresspeople have three goals:
- reelection
- accumulating influence within Congress
- producing good policy
Restricting the goals to re-election provides an accountability mechanism that is fundamental to the interpretation. So for the author's model, congresspeople are "single minded reelection seekers" (p.17). Important to note that congresspeople optimize, not maximize. Diminishing returns on re-election initiatives when you are already 'sure' to win. Very little value on them when you are 'sure' to lose.
Downs constructs a model with parties as the analytic unit. (Parties put forward a platform and voters respond rationally. Congresspeople are just an intermediary.) The author argues that this model misses the reality of Congress. Policy is produced not by cohesive teams but by rivalry and bargaining. Voters cannot form expectations to inform decisions. The author argues that this model is best applied to executive elections (presidents, governors, mayors). These offices produce policy firmly aligned by a single platform. Especially given an incumbent, voters can clearly form expectations.
Specific example the author cites is UK coalition governments. Author argues parties are only coherent there because electoral resources are controlled by party elite...
- Local committees pick candidates based on who will be a loyal party member
- Advertisement and communicative resources (e.g. screen time) are allocated to parties not individuals
- Political posts are given by party leaders to loyal party members
In contrast, congresspeople are selected by direct primary. In order to win the primary, individuals have to mobilize their own resources.
Another specific example is Connecticut. TODO: read...
- Duane Lockard New England State Politics
- Lieberman The Power Broker
- James Barber Leadership Strategies for Legislative Party Cohesion
Author has no expectation of differential behavior in 'marginal seats'. Rather, it's a misnomer. Looking at party swings between elections in individual congressional seats, about a third of variance is explained by national effects. The remainder is local effects. 'All politics is local'. "When we say 'Congressman Smith is unbeatable,' we do not mean that there is nothing he could do that would lose him his seat. Rather we mean, 'Congressman Smith is unbeatable as long as he continues to do the things he is doing.' (p.37).
A major point is that voters don't have solid knowledge or expectations about legislation. They rely on proxies to determine if a legislator supports what they support. And because congresspeople use their own resources to win support
Congresspeople also have a confirmation bias about what 'works'. To face re-election, each has already won a primary and congressional election.
The author describes three categories of re-election activities or assets:
- advertising, which is meant to cover anything from visits, radio time, screen time, to mail (esp. use of franking privilege)
- credit claiming, mainly casework and pork barrel
- Goes back to prior of voters not having knowledge of legislation.
- Author does argue that members of committees can credibly claim credit for pushing or killing specific bills.
- position taking
- Congresspeople can take any number of positions. It isn't limited to actual substantive actions. Just as people are uncertain of legislation, they are uncertain of positions. So positions matter more-so in telling people what they want to hear, rather than what you have done.
- Also an element of issue invention.
Some immediate consequences:
- Senators place relatively more emphasis on credit claiming, as compared to representatives, because they are more credible (i.e., hold greater prestige), have more advertising assets, and have a larger direct constituency that can form more salient interests.
- Also notable that many senators aim to be president, which shapes their long term strategy. TODO: read Perry The New Politics for application to NY assembly and senate.
- Similar trend in old machine cities. TODO: read Snowiss Congressional Recruitment and Representation for application to Chicago.
Part 2
The second part of the book interprets the model, especially with regard to how cooperation and competition is expected to look at the Congressional level.
Congress is well designed for re-election seeking congresspeople.
- Congressional office salaries are designed to service advertisement and credit claiming.
- Committees are designed to service credit and position claiming. Some seem to just be cause committees with no intent of legislation.Others seem to be universal committees, seeking to structure all pork barrel requests into bills that can all pass a vote. Public Works especially. Because there is no limit to their creation, every congressperson can find a minute policy space to claim credit over.
- Congressional parties are designed to service position claiming. Congresspeople are coordinated to produce a meaningful position that all members claim. They can also deviate from the party to whatever degree they want; their membership is earned by primary election rather than selection.
- The Congressional Record, over which they have full editorial control, is designed to service position claiming.
- Franking privileges are designed to service advertisement.
Most importantly: these services and functions are non-rivalrous. Not a zero sum game. It actually looks like a "cross-party conspiracy among incumbents" (p.105).
Consequences:
- Congress is "noisy, versatile, and effective" (p.108). It operates as an opposition. All congresspeople, esp. senators, have an incentive to claim a position in comparison to the current president's policy.
- Party does not matter.
- Congress does not operate as a competitive and representative arena for policy options.
- Some models of legislatures imagine the institution to be a proxy for ad hoc referenda among the population.
- Congresspeople distort that model.
- Bargaining and trading votes
- Selection-out of disfavorable policy options
- Several implements of soft power (e.g., hearings, committees, threats of further legislation) to influence the actual implementation of legislation, beyond the literal terms of it
- No minimum winning coalitions.
- There isn't significant evidence of 'close votes' in the first place.
- Congresspeople default to a 'universal approach'; service own constituents while letting other congresspeople service their constituents.
- When an issue is salient to a congresspersons's constituents, they care only about claiming credit for the 'right side'. Does not matter if their amendment carries, if the bill passes, if the bill is signed, or if the law is good policy; constituents generally only understand the voting record.
- When an issue is salient to organized and informed interest groups, they do start to care about mobilizing and bargaining for votes.
- Parties do not constrain how congresspeople vote.
- Congress will effectively prioritize pork barrel bills, interest group politics, and symbolic votes. Policy bills, especially national programs like welfare and entitlements, have more costs than benefits and will be deprioritized. This will necessarily look like delays and stalling.
- "If it is believed that spending money will 'solve social problems,' then Congress will spend money." (p.139)
There is a tragedy of the commons; congresspeople want pork barrel bills and the ability to push more pork barrel bills next year. The whole body self-regulates to ensure that the 'commons' is maintained. The leaders (speaker, majority leader) and control committees (Rules; Appropriations; Ways and Means) are the maintainers.
- Of these, only Appropriations and Ways and Means offer a conventional re-election asset. But all of these are evidently desirable positions.
The closest Senate equivalent is the Finance committee, doesn't regulate spending in the same way, reflecting the different interests of senators. TODO: read: Manley The Politics of Finance.
Reading Notes
The author makes suggestions for congressional reforms, to disincentivize pork barrel bills and incentivize good policy bills. These come across as naive.
There's substantial reference to city government, especially when suggesting reforms. Setting city legislatures aside as being different in part 1, then suggesting an adoption of their structure in part 2, seems like a fallacy at best and abandonment of the model (from legislator agents to an institution as the agent) at worst.
I think the author is a bit too dismissive of the idea that marginal congresspeople either tie their re-election aspirations to the president's popularity, or try to push bad policy in order to sabotage the president's popularity.