Differences between revisions 5 and 14 (spanning 9 versions)
Revision 5 as of 2025-04-09 20:16:38
Size: 4284
Comment: Clarifications on Canada/Mexico
Revision 14 as of 2026-02-17 22:21:44
Size: 9476
Comment: Updates
Deletions are marked like this. Additions are marked like this.
Line 21: Line 21:
Immediate actions taken by Trump upon election included:

=== Immediate Program ===

Immediate actions taken by Trump upon election were largely targeted at [[China/XiJinping|China]], [[Mexico/ClaudiaSheinbaum|Mexico]], and [[Canada/JustinTrudeau|Canada]].
Line 24: Line 28:
   * ''Temporary'' exceptions were made for specific manufacturers, especially automotive manufacturers, for imports from Canada and Mexico that are compliant with [[UnitedStates/EconomicPolicy/UnitedStatesMexicoCanadaAgreement|USMCA]].
   * The implementation of these tariffs was delayed for effectively a month.
Line 27: Line 29:
   * The USPS and [[UnitedStates/CustomsAndBorderProtection|CBP]] were not prepared to process duties in this manner, so parcel services with China and [[China/HongKong|Hong Kong]] were closed immediately. The fallout of this closure forced the administration to delay implementation for about a month.
   * Bundled into the announcement of a delay, however, was a declaration of intent to end the ''de minimis'' exemption on parcels from Canada and Mexico ''in addition'' to China.
Line 30: Line 30:
The anticipation of a tariff war contributed to the downfall of the [[Canada/JustinTrudeau|Trudeau]] government. Trudeau and [[Canada/ChrystiaFreeland|Freeland]] disagreed on how to respond to the threat, and the latter's resignation triggered a loss of confidence. Trudeau resigned and announced a leadership contest, through which [[Canada/MarkCarney|Carney]] emerged the winner. The measures set against Mexico and Canada quickly dissolved. First, temporary exceptions were made for specific manufacturers, especially automotive manufacturers, for imports from Canada and Mexico that are compliant with [[UnitedStates/EconomicPolicy/UnitedStatesMexicoCanadaAgreement|USMCA]]. Then the implementation was delayed entirely.
Line 32: Line 32:
In the meantime, provincial governments retaliated within their powers. [[Canada/DougFord|Ontario]] announced export fees on energy and threatened to ban energy exports entirely. Several provinces, such as [[https://news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2025PREM0032-000187|British Columbia]], effectively banned importation of American alcohol through their control of alcohol distribution. In the context of these policies, the new Carney government announced retaliatory tariffs on American raw goods such as steel and aluminum. Similarly, the ''de minimis'' implementation quickly fell through. USPS and [[UnitedStates/CustomsAndBorderProtection|CBP]] were not prepared to process duties for this quantity of small parcels, so parcel services with China and [[China/HongKong|Hong Kong]] were closed immediately. The fallout of this closure forced the administration to delay implementation entirely.
Line 34: Line 34:
By comparison, [[Mexico/ClaudiaSheinbaum|Sheinbaum]] approached the threat of tariffs diplomatically. It is nonetheless important to note that the ''anticipation'' of a tariff war contributed to the downfall of the [[Canada/JustinTrudeau|Trudeau]] government. Trudeau and [[Canada/ChrystiaFreeland|Freeland]] disagreed on how to respond to the threat, and the latter's resignation triggered a loss of confidence. Trudeau resigned and announced a leadership contest, through which [[Canada/MarkCarney|Carney]] emerged the winner. In the meantime, provincial governments retaliated within their powers. [[Canada/DougFord|Ontario]] announced export fees on energy and threatened to ban energy exports entirely. Several provinces, such as [[https://news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2025PREM0032-000187|British Columbia]], effectively banned importation of American alcohol through their control of alcohol distribution.
Line 36: Line 36:
In the following weeks, the administration took these further steps:
 * Set tariffs of 25% on all car, steel, and aluminum imports.
 * Following the above noted delay, the USPS implemented ending the ''de minimis'' exemption on parcels from China.
Line 40: Line 37:
Actions taken in April 2025 included:
 * Set 'baseline' tariffs of 10% on all imports.
 * Set supplemental 'reciprocal' tariffs. These are in fact calculated according to [[Economics/BalanceOfPayments|BOP]].

=== Section 232 Program ===

There was also an attempt at a tariff program based on determinations of national security. This is largely concerned with cars, steel, and aluminum. These tariff powers are derived from section 232 of the '''Trade Expansion Act''' in 1962.

In March, tariffs were set at 25% on all car, steel, and aluminum imports. This led to several reciprocal tariffs being set against the U.S.:
 * [[Germany/UrsulaVonDerLeyen|Von Der Leyen]] announced reciprocal tariffs on steel and aluminum coming into the [[WorldHistory/EuropeanUnion|EU]]. Of the 27 member states, only [[Hungary/VictorOrban|Hungary]] voted against these measures. Implementation however was delayed as diplomatic options were being exercised.
 * The new Carney government announced retaliatory tariffs on American raw goods such as steel and aluminum.

In June, these rates were doubled to 50%. As well, the [[UnitedStates/DepartmentOfCommerce|DoC]] determined that appliances made of steel and aluminum are covered by steel tariffs.

In August, copper was added to this list.

In October and November, multiple new categories of tariffs were introduced also on the basis of section 232. Bilateral trade deals do supersede these however.
 * 25% tariffs on "medium- and heavy-duty trucks, truck parts, and buses"
 * 10% on softwood lumber
 * 25% on upholstered furniture, increasing in the future to 30%
 * 25% on kitchen cabinets and vanities, increasing in the future to 50%

The 'in the future' increases above were originally announced to be effective January 2026, but were delayed by one year in December 2025.

In January 2026, semiconductor tariffs set at 25% were introduced also on the basis of section 232.



=== Reciprocal Program ===

In April 2025, a 'standardized' tariff program was announced.
 * 'Baseline' tariffs of 10% on all imports.
 * Supplemental 'reciprocal' tariffs set on a country-by-country basis. These are in fact calculated according to [[Economics/BalanceOfPayments|BOP]]; they are not reciprocal.
Line 45: Line 69:
   * The implementation of these all were delayed, except for the escalation with [[China/XiJinping|China]] (see below).
Line 47: Line 70:
As noted above, tariffs were already set on Mexico and Canada, and exemptions had already been created. The supplemental tariffs would have raised these rates, but as noted above, the implementation of those were delayed. Carney had already announced and implemented reciprocal tariffs on car imports from the U.S. China became a nexus for the trade war. [[China/XiJinping|Jinping]] announced retaliatory tariffs on American agriculture and export controls on specific manufacturers. A sequence of ratcheting escalations landed on tariff rates of 145% (into U.S.) and 125% (into China). In an attempt to make the rates more punishing, Trump announced that the reciprocal tariffs for all other countries were frozen for 3 months.
Line 49: Line 72:
[[Germany/UrsulaVonDerLeyen|Von Der Leyen]] announced reciprocal tariffs on steel and aluminum. Of the 27 member states, only [[Hungary/VictorOrban|Hungary]] voted against these measures. Unexpectedly though, a bilateral agreement emerged in early May that set a framework for lowering tariff rates to 30% (into U.S.) and 10% (into China). This deal was briefly reneged at the end of May on the basis of rare earths export controls, but re-entered within a couple weeks. A more concrete agreement was announced in November; tariffs on imports from China were lowered by another 10%.
Line 51: Line 74:
[[China/XiJinping|Jinping]] announced retaliatory tariffs on American agriculture and export controls on specific manufacturers. A sequence of ratcheting escalations landed on tariffs of 125% on all imports from China, and semi-reciprocal 84% tariffs on all imports from the U.S. Aside from China, these bilateral trade deals emerged within the freeze period:
 * In May, [[UnitedKingdom/KeirStarmer|Starmer]] announced a piecewise deal. The tariff rate applied to cars is lowered to 10% (into U.S.). Steel, aluminum, and specific aerospace components are exempted from tariffs entirely. The UK meanwhile will drop trade barriers against beef imports.
 * Shortly after the 'reciprocal' tariffs were announced, [[Vietnam]] lowered tariffs unilaterally. A deal emerged in late June: rates were set at 20% (into U.S.) and 0% (into Vietnam). Additionally, goods that are only shipped through Vietnam into the U.S. face an additional 20% tariff upon arrival.
 * [[Indonesia]] negotiated rates set at 19% (into U.S.) and 0% (into Indonesia). Significant purchase orders by the Indonesian government of U.S. energy, agricultural products, and military jets were also components of the negotiated deal.
 * [[Japan/ShigeruIshiba|Japan]] negotiated lower rates on cars and automotive parts; while a rate of 25% applies to all other countries, imports from Japan will be taxed at 15%. The agreement also set a ceiling of 10% on lumber tariffs.
 * Around the same time, [[SouthKorea|South Korea]] also negotiated a 15% rate. It was not formalized until November however. The 15% rate here is applied to all tariffs.
 * Von Der Leyen announced a deal in late July. Due to the structure of the EU, there are opportunities for it to fall through, but the negotiated rates are 15% for most goods (into U.S.) (exception for steel, taxed at 50%) and 0% (into EU). Significant purchase orders of U.S. energy are also part of the deal.
Line 53: Line 82:
Many nations have attempted to negotiate exemptions or even reduce the pre-existing trade barriers. [[UnitedKingdom/KeirStarmer|Starmer]] declined to formulate an immediate response to tariffs being set. [[Vietnam]] lowered tariffs preemptively. In contrast, several countries were targeted with further actions in July. The context however reveals that these tariff actions are about geopolitics rather than trade.
 * Tariffs of 25%, plus an unspecified penalty, were set on imports from [[India/NarendraModi|India]]. The penalty is conditioned on whether India continues to purchase energy from [[Russia/VladimirPutin|Russia]]. It is notable that this rate is lower than the 27% announced in April.
   * Lifted in February 2026 through a trade agreement; see below.
 * Tariffs of 50% were set on most imports from [[Brazil/LuizInacioLulaDaSilva|Brazil]]--products such as aerospace parts are exempted. This was announced alongside sanctions for the judge overseeing the prosecution of [[Brazil/JairBolsonaro|Bolsonaro]].
   * Partially lifted (for agricultural products) in November.
 * Additional tariffs of 10%, with a planned rise to 25%, were announced against countries opposed to a U.S. annexation of Greenland. The EU responded by 'pausing' the earlier trade agreement and threatening to invoke the '''Anti-Coercion Instrument''' ('''ACI'''). Trump backed down from this plan within a week.

Later bilateral trade agreements include:
 * A series of agreements with Asian nations ([[Australia]], [[Thailand]], [[Cambodia]], [[Malaysia]], and Vietnam) were announced in October; none of these actually addressed the 'reciprocal' tariffs.
 * In November, [[Switzerland]] and [[Liechtenstein]] negotiated a U.S. tariff rate of 15%. Then in January Trump announced that the tariffs against Swiss imports were a personal attack against [[Switzerland/Presidents|Karin Keller-Sutter]].
 * [[ElSalvador|El Salvador]] and [[Guatemala]] negotiated a U.S. tariff rate of 10%, with tariffs removed on specific goods qualifying under the 2004 '''Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement''' ('''CAFTA-DR''').
 * Also in November, vague agreements (i.e., tariffs removed on specific goods which are not specified) were made with [[Argentina]] and [[Ecuador]].
 * In January 2026, [[Taiwan]] negotiated a U.S. tariff rate of 15%.
 * In February, agreements were negotiated with India (U.S. tariff rate lowered to 18%) and [[Bangladesh]] (lowered to 19%).
 * Also in February, another vague agreement was made with [[NorthMacedonia|North Macedonia]].

The ''de minimis'' exemption was eventually closed (worldwide in August, and specifically in China in April).

Trump Tariffs

A history of the tariffs under Trump.


First Administration

TODO: learn some history!


Second Administration

Immediate Program

Immediate actions taken by Trump upon election were largely targeted at China, Mexico, and Canada.

  • Set tariffs of 20% on all imports from Chinese

  • Set tariffs of 25% on many specific imports from Canada and Mexico

  • Ordered the USPS end the de minimis exemption on parcels from China.

The measures set against Mexico and Canada quickly dissolved. First, temporary exceptions were made for specific manufacturers, especially automotive manufacturers, for imports from Canada and Mexico that are compliant with USMCA. Then the implementation was delayed entirely.

Similarly, the de minimis implementation quickly fell through. USPS and CBP were not prepared to process duties for this quantity of small parcels, so parcel services with China and Hong Kong were closed immediately. The fallout of this closure forced the administration to delay implementation entirely.

It is nonetheless important to note that the anticipation of a tariff war contributed to the downfall of the Trudeau government. Trudeau and Freeland disagreed on how to respond to the threat, and the latter's resignation triggered a loss of confidence. Trudeau resigned and announced a leadership contest, through which Carney emerged the winner. In the meantime, provincial governments retaliated within their powers. Ontario announced export fees on energy and threatened to ban energy exports entirely. Several provinces, such as British Columbia, effectively banned importation of American alcohol through their control of alcohol distribution.

Section 232 Program

There was also an attempt at a tariff program based on determinations of national security. This is largely concerned with cars, steel, and aluminum. These tariff powers are derived from section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act in 1962.

In March, tariffs were set at 25% on all car, steel, and aluminum imports. This led to several reciprocal tariffs being set against the U.S.:

  • Von Der Leyen announced reciprocal tariffs on steel and aluminum coming into the EU. Of the 27 member states, only Hungary voted against these measures. Implementation however was delayed as diplomatic options were being exercised.

  • The new Carney government announced retaliatory tariffs on American raw goods such as steel and aluminum.

In June, these rates were doubled to 50%. As well, the DoC determined that appliances made of steel and aluminum are covered by steel tariffs.

In August, copper was added to this list.

In October and November, multiple new categories of tariffs were introduced also on the basis of section 232. Bilateral trade deals do supersede these however.

  • 25% tariffs on "medium- and heavy-duty trucks, truck parts, and buses"
  • 10% on softwood lumber
  • 25% on upholstered furniture, increasing in the future to 30%
  • 25% on kitchen cabinets and vanities, increasing in the future to 50%

The 'in the future' increases above were originally announced to be effective January 2026, but were delayed by one year in December 2025.

In January 2026, semiconductor tariffs set at 25% were introduced also on the basis of section 232.

Reciprocal Program

In April 2025, a 'standardized' tariff program was announced.

  • 'Baseline' tariffs of 10% on all imports.
  • Supplemental 'reciprocal' tariffs set on a country-by-country basis. These are in fact calculated according to BOP; they are not reciprocal.

China became a nexus for the trade war. Jinping announced retaliatory tariffs on American agriculture and export controls on specific manufacturers. A sequence of ratcheting escalations landed on tariff rates of 145% (into U.S.) and 125% (into China). In an attempt to make the rates more punishing, Trump announced that the reciprocal tariffs for all other countries were frozen for 3 months.

Unexpectedly though, a bilateral agreement emerged in early May that set a framework for lowering tariff rates to 30% (into U.S.) and 10% (into China). This deal was briefly reneged at the end of May on the basis of rare earths export controls, but re-entered within a couple weeks. A more concrete agreement was announced in November; tariffs on imports from China were lowered by another 10%.

Aside from China, these bilateral trade deals emerged within the freeze period:

  • In May, Starmer announced a piecewise deal. The tariff rate applied to cars is lowered to 10% (into U.S.). Steel, aluminum, and specific aerospace components are exempted from tariffs entirely. The UK meanwhile will drop trade barriers against beef imports.

  • Shortly after the 'reciprocal' tariffs were announced, Vietnam lowered tariffs unilaterally. A deal emerged in late June: rates were set at 20% (into U.S.) and 0% (into Vietnam). Additionally, goods that are only shipped through Vietnam into the U.S. face an additional 20% tariff upon arrival.

  • Indonesia negotiated rates set at 19% (into U.S.) and 0% (into Indonesia). Significant purchase orders by the Indonesian government of U.S. energy, agricultural products, and military jets were also components of the negotiated deal.

  • Japan negotiated lower rates on cars and automotive parts; while a rate of 25% applies to all other countries, imports from Japan will be taxed at 15%. The agreement also set a ceiling of 10% on lumber tariffs.

  • Around the same time, South Korea also negotiated a 15% rate. It was not formalized until November however. The 15% rate here is applied to all tariffs.

  • Von Der Leyen announced a deal in late July. Due to the structure of the EU, there are opportunities for it to fall through, but the negotiated rates are 15% for most goods (into U.S.) (exception for steel, taxed at 50%) and 0% (into EU). Significant purchase orders of U.S. energy are also part of the deal.

In contrast, several countries were targeted with further actions in July. The context however reveals that these tariff actions are about geopolitics rather than trade.

  • Tariffs of 25%, plus an unspecified penalty, were set on imports from India. The penalty is conditioned on whether India continues to purchase energy from Russia. It is notable that this rate is lower than the 27% announced in April.

    • Lifted in February 2026 through a trade agreement; see below.
  • Tariffs of 50% were set on most imports from Brazil--products such as aerospace parts are exempted. This was announced alongside sanctions for the judge overseeing the prosecution of Bolsonaro.

    • Partially lifted (for agricultural products) in November.
  • Additional tariffs of 10%, with a planned rise to 25%, were announced against countries opposed to a U.S. annexation of Greenland. The EU responded by 'pausing' the earlier trade agreement and threatening to invoke the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI). Trump backed down from this plan within a week.

Later bilateral trade agreements include:

  • A series of agreements with Asian nations (Australia, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Vietnam) were announced in October; none of these actually addressed the 'reciprocal' tariffs.

  • In November, Switzerland and Liechtenstein negotiated a U.S. tariff rate of 15%. Then in January Trump announced that the tariffs against Swiss imports were a personal attack against Karin Keller-Sutter.

  • El Salvador and Guatemala negotiated a U.S. tariff rate of 10%, with tariffs removed on specific goods qualifying under the 2004 Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).

  • Also in November, vague agreements (i.e., tariffs removed on specific goods which are not specified) were made with Argentina and Ecuador.

  • In January 2026, Taiwan negotiated a U.S. tariff rate of 15%.

  • In February, agreements were negotiated with India (U.S. tariff rate lowered to 18%) and Bangladesh (lowered to 19%).

  • Also in February, another vague agreement was made with North Macedonia.

The de minimis exemption was eventually closed (worldwide in August, and specifically in China in April).


CategoryRicottone CategoryTodoLearnHistory

UnitedStates/EconomicPolicy/TrumpTariffs (last edited 2026-02-25 18:16:47 by DominicRicottone)