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| * [[SocialChoiceDemocracyAndFreeMarkets|Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets]], James M. Buchanan, 1954 * [[IndividualChoiceInVotingAndTheMarket|Individual Choice in Voting and the Market]], James M. Buchanan, 1954 |
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| * [[TheCalculusOfConsent|The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy]], James M. Buchanon and Gordon Tullock, 1962 | * [[PositiveEconomicsWelfareEconomicsAndPoliticalEconomy|Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy]], James M. Buchanan, 1959 * [[TheCalculusOfConsent|The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy]], James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, 1962 |
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| * [[BargainingInLegislatures|Bargaining in Legislatures]], David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn, 1989 * [[CandidateDrivenTicketSplittingInThe2000JapaneseElections|Candidate-driven ticket splitting in the 2000 Japanese elections]], Barry C. Burden, 2009 * [[WhenLoyaltyIsTested|When Loyalty Is Tested: Do Party Leaders Use Committee Assignments as Rewards?]], Nicole Asmussen and Adam J. Ramey, 2018 |
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| * [[WhoCares|Who cares? Measuring differences in preference intensity]]; Charlotte Cavaillé, Daniel L. Chen, and Karine Van der Straeten; 2025 * [[MeasuringPartyLoyalty|Measuring party loyalty]], Adam J. Ramey, 2026 * [[WhatElectabilityMeansToVotersAndHowItAffectsTheirDecisions|What electability means to voters and how it affects their decisions]], Mayya Komisarchik and Alessio Albarello, 2026 |
Rational Choice Voting
Rational choice voting is a theory of voting behavior that studies the game theoretic and comparative outcomes.
Description
Essentially Institutional Design applied to democratic voting rules.
The foundations of this theory come from Downs.
Reading Notes
Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets, James M. Buchanan, 1954
Individual Choice in Voting and the Market, James M. Buchanan, 1954
An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs, 1957
Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy, James M. Buchanan, 1959
The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, 1962
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, William H. Riker and Peter Ordeshook, 1968
Bargaining in Legislatures, David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn, 1989
Candidate-driven ticket splitting in the 2000 Japanese elections, Barry C. Burden, 2009
When Loyalty Is Tested: Do Party Leaders Use Committee Assignments as Rewards?, Nicole Asmussen and Adam J. Ramey, 2018
Access to Healthcare and Voting: The Case of Hospital Closures in Rural America; Christian Cox, Derek A. Epp, and Michael E. Shepherd; 2024
Understanding Voter Fatigue: Election Frequency and Electoral Abstention Approval, Filip Kostelka, 2025
The direct cost to voters of polling site closures and consolidation, Scott Abramson and Sharece Thrower, 2025
Who cares? Measuring differences in preference intensity; Charlotte Cavaillé, Daniel L. Chen, and Karine Van der Straeten; 2025
Measuring party loyalty, Adam J. Ramey, 2026
What electability means to voters and how it affects their decisions, Mayya Komisarchik and Alessio Albarello, 2026