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| See [[[[HasTheOutbiddingOnTradeProtectionismFinallyEnded|Drezner]] for a theory of competition between [[UnitedStates/PoliticalParties|U.S. parties]]. | See [[HasTheOutbiddingOnTradeProtectionismFinallyEnded|Drezner]] for a theory of competition between [[UnitedStates/PoliticalParties|U.S. parties]]. |
Outbidding
Outbidding is a framework for analyzing competitive political systems.
Contents
Formulation
The theory is meant for competitive democratic systems. It all rests on political entrepreneurship (i.e., building coalitions by promising benefits or policies to constituents). Naturally, the winning politician will be the one that promised the most (or outbidded the competition).
Within constituencies wherein the population homogeneously values a benefit, the outbidding is expected to lead to over-investment.
Within constituencies with deep social cleavages, the outbidding is expected to take the shape of identity politics (i.e., promising benefits or policies affecting an exclusion of an out-group) and lead to extremism.
History
The fundamental idea of competitive bidding is not novel to political science and economics. However, as a political economy framework, it has some utility in ethnic and political party studies.
See Rabushka and Shepsle for a theory of democratic instability in plural states.
See Drezner for a theory of competition between U.S. parties.