Differences between revisions 25 and 26
Revision 25 as of 2026-02-13 04:37:13
Size: 4998
Comment: Link
Revision 26 as of 2026-02-13 05:43:20
Size: 2987
Comment: Details
Deletions are marked like this. Additions are marked like this.
Line 32: Line 32:
 * [[WinningTheWestToMunicipalReform|Winning the West to Municipal Reform]], Amy Bridges, 1992
Line 34: Line 33:
 * [[CentralizedVersusDecentralizedProvisionOfLocalPublicGoods|Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach]], Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, 2003
 * [[ForeignPolicyBeginsAtHome|Foreign Policy Begins at Home]], Richard N. Haass, 2013
Line 38: Line 35:
 * [[DolceFarNiente|Dolce far niente? Non-compliance and blame avoidance in the EU]]; Lisa Kriegmair, Berthold Rittberger, Bernhard Zangl, and Tim Heinkelmann-Wild; 2021
 * [[ACaseForCongress|A Case for Congress: Shared Power for a Divided Society]], Frances E. Lee, 2024
 * [[AgencyInstitutionsAndWelfareChauvinism|Agency, institutions, and welfare chauvinism: Tracing the exclusion of European Union migrant citizens from social assistance in Germany]]; Dominic Afscharian, Cecilia Bruzelius, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser; 2024
 * [[WhenIncumbentsSuccessfullyRetrenchBigAndPopularSocialPolicies|When incumbents successfully retrench big and popular social policies: policy design matters]], Marta Arretche and Pedro H. G. F. Souza, 2024
 * [[TermLimitsInParliamentAndElectoralDisconnection|Term limits in parliament and electoral disconnection: the case of the Five Star Movement]]; Francesco Bromo, Paolo Gambacciani, and Marco Improta; 2024
 * [[TheEffectsOfDistrictMagnitudeOnTheNumberOfIntraPartyFactions|The effects of district magnitude on the number of intra-party factions: the case of Colombia, 1958–1990]] Germán Campos-Herrera and Patricio Navia, 2024
Line 48: Line 39:
 * [[CompanyTowns|Company Towns: Single-Industry Dominance and Local Government Capacity]], Elizabeth Mitchell Elder, 2025
 * [[WhoKnowsHowToGovern|Who Knows How to Govern? Procedural Knowledge in India’s Small-Town Councils]]; Adam Michael Auerbach, Shikhar Singh, and Tariq Thachil; 2025
 * [[LegislativeEffectivenessInTheAmericanStates|Legislative Effectiveness in the American States]]; Peter Bucchianeri, Craig Volden, and Alan E. Wiseman; 2025

Institutional Design

Institutional design is a field that studies the game theoretic and comparative outcomes of structures.


Description

Institutional design is the study of how actors behave within an institution (or otherwise-defined rule set) and of how to shape an institution to yield certain behavior.

It implicitly assumes instrumentalism in that the form of institutions derives from utility rather than philosophy. Beyond this, it generally builds from either public choice or social choice methods for measuring and comparing utility. Legislators are generally characterized by some combination of credit claiming and blame avoiding.

If assumptions about rationality and utility functions are not being made, the work is better classified under comparative politics.

For studies of democratic (little d, one-person-one-vote) voting rules, the theory of rational choice voting is the appropriate specialization.


Reading Notes


CategoryRicottone

PoliticalScience/InstitutionalDesign (last edited 2026-03-09 17:57:44 by DominicRicottone)