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| * [[ForeignPolicyBeginsAtHome|Foreign Policy Begins at Home]], Richard N. Haass, 2013 | |
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| * [[DemandingMoreThanWhatYouWant|Demanding more than what you want]], Zuheir Desai and Scott A. Tyson, 2025 * [[UnderstandingVoterFatigue|Understanding Voter Fatigue: Election Frequency and Electoral Abstention Approval]], Filip Kostelka, 2025 * [[PersistentUnilateralAction|Persistent unilateral action]], David Foster, 2025 |
Institutional Design
Institutional design is a field that studies the game theoretic and comparative outcomes of structures.
Contents
Reading Notes
An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs, 1957
The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, James M. Buchanon and Gordon Tullock, 1962
The Theory of Political Coalitions William H. Riker, 1962
Congressmen in Committees, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., 1973
Congress: The Electoral Connection, David R. Mayhew, 1974
Foreign Policy Begins at Home, Richard N. Haass, 2013
The Limits of Party: Congress and Lawmaking in a Polarized Era, Frances E. Lee, 2020
A Case for Congress: Shared Power for a Divided Society, Frances E. Lee, 2024
Demanding more than what you want, Zuheir Desai and Scott A. Tyson, 2025
Understanding Voter Fatigue: Election Frequency and Electoral Abstention Approval, Filip Kostelka, 2025
Persistent unilateral action, David Foster, 2025