= Electoral Systems = '''Electoral systems''' is a subfield of comparative politics. <> ---- == Description == When electoral systems are studied with strong assumptions about rationality and utility functions, it is called [[PoliticalScience/InstitutionalDesign|institutional design]]. When countries are the unit of analysis, national descriptives like ethnic cleavages and resource wealth are taken as given. Often these environmental factors explain the differential outcomes. When parties are the unit of analysis, the structure of the state is taken as given. Often the aspects of a political system like [[ConceptualizingAndMeasuringDistrictMagnitudeForComparativeResearch|district magnitude]] explain the differential outcomes. There is structuralism, but not not necessarily individual agency. ---- == Reading Notes == * [[JapanIn1994|Japan in 1994: Out with the Old, in with the New?]], Michael Blaker, 1995 * [[CentralizedVersusDecentralizedProvisionOfLocalPublicGoods|Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach]], Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, 2003 * [[ElectoralReformAndTheEvolutionOfInformalNormsInJapan|Electoral Reform and the Evolution of Informal Norms in Japan]], Matthew M. Carlson, 2006 * [[ForeignPolicyBeginsAtHome|Foreign Policy Begins at Home]], Richard N. Haass, 2013 * [[RacialConflictInGlobalSociety|Racial Conflict in Global Society]], John Stone and Polly Rizova, 2014 * [[DolceFarNiente|Dolce far niente? Non-compliance and blame avoidance in the EU]]; Lisa Kriegmair, Berthold Rittberger, Bernhard Zangl, and Tim Heinkelmann-Wild; 2021 * [[AgencyInstitutionsAndWelfareChauvinism|Agency, institutions, and welfare chauvinism: Tracing the exclusion of European Union migrant citizens from social assistance in Germany]]; Dominic Afscharian, Cecilia Bruzelius, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser; 2024 * [[WhenIncumbentsSuccessfullyRetrenchBigAndPopularSocialPolicies|When incumbents successfully retrench big and popular social policies: policy design matters]], Marta Arretche and Pedro H. G. F. Souza, 2024 * [[ACaseForCongress|A Case for Congress: Shared Power for a Divided Society]], Frances E. Lee, 2024 * [[TheEffectsOfDistrictMagnitudeOnTheNumberOfIntraPartyFactions|The effects of district magnitude on the number of intra-party factions: the case of Colombia, 1958–1990]] Germán Campos-Herrera and Patricio Navia, 2024 * [[TermLimitsInParliamentAndElectoralDisconnection|Term limits in parliament and electoral disconnection: the case of the Five Star Movement]]; Francesco Bromo, Paolo Gambacciani, and Marco Improta; 2024 * [[LegislativeEffectivenessInTheAmericanStates|Legislative Effectiveness in the American States]]; Peter Bucchianeri, Craig Volden, and Alan E. Wiseman; 2025 * [[BureaucraticPoliticsInCustomizedImplementationOfTheEUSingleUsePlasticsDirectiveInFranceAndGermany|Bureaucratic politics in customized implementation of the EU Single-Use Plastics Directive in France and Germany]], Anna Simstich, 2025 * [[EuropeanIntegrationAndTransformedParliamentaryOpposition|European integration and transformed parliamentary opposition: Evidence from five decades of legislative politics]], Karl Loxbo and Brigitte Pircher, 2026 * [[RebelsInTheHouse|Rebels in the house: Do anti-elitist parties vote differently?]], Simon Otjes and Luc Vorsteveld, 2026 * [[ConceptualizingAndMeasuringDistrictMagnitudeForComparativeResearch|Conceptualizing and measuring district magnitude for comparative research: How to do it and why it matters]], Orit Kedar and Gilad Hurvitz; 2026 ---- CategoryRicottone